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From The Editor
Could amnesty save the KPK?
The second question confronting President Yudhoyono 
is, how can the KPK and its anti- corruption campaign 
survive in a meaningful form?
Back in August, when rumours of the impending arrest 
of two KPK deputies were first circulating, the Report 
met with a former deputy of the KPK — one who has 
not since been arrested — and asked him what the KPK 
hoped to do for Indonesia.  He replied that the KPK was 
working to achieve in Indonesia what the Independent 
Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) had achieved 
in Hong Kong. Over 30 years ago, he explained, the 
ICAC began to transform Hong Kong from a city awash 
in corruption to the clean(er) city it is today. Hong Kong 
was ranked 12th in Transparency International’s 2009 
Corruptions Perception Index, ahead of Germany, Japan, 
and the United Kingdom, among many others.
As we find ourselves several months into the KPK- National 
Police- AGO fiasco, the case of the ICAC is not only a 
model for what the KPK could achieve, it also provides 
a model for how the KPK could survive.
First, the ICAC is independent, but its powers are not 
unchecked. It is independent of the police and the civil 
service but it reports to the chief executive of Hong Kong. 
It is not, then, a ‘superbody’ accountable only to God, 
as has been claimed of the KPK. Nor is it, as had first 
been tried in Hong Kong, situated within the existing 
law enforcement bodies where it is sure to be stymied by 
vested interests. 
Achieving institutional independence, especially when it 
comes to human resources within the KPK, is paramount 
and widely-stated. Equally important is imposing 
systematic legal checks against the KPK’s power, so that 
critiques by the police or politicians about the KPK 
overstepping its authority would be less likely to gain 
traction.
Striking the right balance between independence and 
accountability will require that all stakeholders have 
the best interests of the KPK at heart, which is unlikely 
when you consider that over 100 members of the House 
are currently under investigation. It is not plausible that 
there will be political will to save the KPK if politicians 
Two questions confront President Yudhoyono. The first is 
how to bring resolution to the current conflict between the 
Anti-Corruption Commission (KPK), and the National 
Police and the Attorney General’s Office. 
For Yudhoyono, this is not a question of how to achieve 
justice as much as it is a question of how to achieve calm. 
According to one member of Team 8, the fact-finding 
team appointed by the president to investigate the case 
against KPK deputies Bibit Samad Rianto and Chandra 
M Hamza, the present crisis is proving evocative of 1998 
and the fall of Suharto. And it was Yudhoyono’s fear of 
the possible reoccurrence of such events that lead to the 
establishment of Team 8. 
Thus, the real purpose of Team 8 was not to evaluate 
the case of Bibit and Chandra, which was weak at best. 
Instead, Team 8 was the first step in series of moves that 
could allow President Yudhoyono to save face:  his own, 
the National Police, and the Attorney General’s Office 
(AGO), and to reach at least a tenuous resolution in the 
case against Bibit and Chandra. 
As explained by one lawyer close to the case, this resolution 
is likely to see the police investigators bringing the case 
to the AGO, who would accept it. By accepting the case, 
the AGO would vouch for the strength of the case. This is 
particularly important because if the AGO does not accept 
the case, the police investigators could be prosecuted for 
pursuing a case without sufficient evidence. The AGO 
may then take advantage of a particular clause in the 
constitution that allows them not to prosecute a case — 
even if there is sufficient evidence — because to do so is 
not in the public interest. This is known by the Dutch legal 
term ‘deponering.’ There may still be pressure for Bibit 
and Chandra to resign, and though their reaction to such 
a request could prolong and complicate the resolution, it 
most likely will not prevent a resolution.
This resolution would allow the president, who does not 
want to be seen as overstepping his authority or angering 
the police or AGO, to find a quasi-legal solution to his 
political problem. It is a solution that would essentially 
allow Yudhoyono to intervene without intervening, and 
if successful, would turn the public’s interest to something 
else, like Jakarta’s rampant blackouts. 
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are fearful of being prosecuted by the institution they 
empower. 
For its part, the Hong Kong police department was so 
unhappy with the newly founded the ICAC that they 
staged a general strike. Bowing to the pressure, the chief 
executive in Hong Kong decided that it would be best 
if the ICAC granted a general amnesty and would only 
prosecute offences committed after the amnesty. What 
this amounted to was a bargain between the police and the 
ICAC:  The ICAC would not go after sitting politicians 
or officers for past offences and, in return, these politicians 
and officers would not challenge the authority of the 
Commission.
This was a highly controversial decision and was widely 
seen as a victory of the police over the ICAC. Yet in 
the long term, granting amnesty allowed the ICAC to 
survive and to flourish.  Police and other members of 
the civil society in Hong Kong were willing to support 
the ICAC when they no longer harboured fear that they 
would be prosecuted for past crimes. This gave the ICAC 
breathing room and allowed it to prosecute new crimes 
under stricter anti-corruption laws and to implement a 
campaign to change the endemic ‘culture of corruption.’ 
In short, amnesty gave the ICAC room to do its job. So 
effective was it in investigating and prosecuting crimes 
in the public sector, that it began receiving fewer and 
fewer complaints about the police and civil service, and 
was able to turn most of its attention to monitoring the 
private sector. 
In the shadow of the Bank Century case and amid the 
continuous chatter of ‘cicak-buaya,’ President Yudhoyono 
cannot be the one to suggest granting amnesty to corrupt 
politicians and civil servants. Likewise, the KPK leadership 
is also unlikely to extend a generous offer to those who 
would prefer to see the KPK sidelined forever. But once 
this immediate conflict is resolved, it may actually be in 
the best interest of the KPK to extend an olive branch 
of amnesty, if only to generate enough political will to 
see to its survival.
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INTELLIGENCE
Sjamsoeddin is still on the waiting list
•	 Three-star	Army	Lt.	Gen.	Sjafrie	Sjamsoeddin,	current	Secretary	General	of	the	Ministry	of	Defence,	had	been	
 named as the candidate for Cabinet Secretary, but following a United States decision not to issue him a visa, it 
 is unlikely he will take office. 
Three Military Chiefs of Staff are replaced; TNI Chief to follow
•	 Following	the	removal	of	the	Chiefs	of	Staff	of	the	Army,	Navy,	and	Air	Force,	President	Yudhoyono	may	also	
 replace incumbent Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) Commander Gen. Djoko Santoso in the coming 
 months.
SPECIAL FEATURE
The ‘judicial mafia’ and judicial reform in Indonesia
•	 Local,	national,	and	international	organizations	and	civil	society	have	long	labelled	the	Indonesian	judiciary	as	
 one the weakest and most corrupt elements in Indonesia. The Reformasi era has so far seen the establishment of 
 promising institutions including the Judicial Commission, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), 
 the Corruption Crimes Court, and the Constitutional Court. However, vested interests plague the operations 
 of these institutions and the Indonesian judiciary remains unreformed and highly susceptible to economic and 
 political pressures.
INTERVIEW
Sebastiaan Pompe
•	 The	Indonesian	judiciary	has	become	increasing	independent	through	institutional	reform	such	as	the	‘one-	roof	
 system’ which is designed to allow the judiciary to work without government interference. A number of obstacles 
 remain including the broad area of internal operations, improving service delivery, and unabated corruption in 
 the courts. The political will to reform the judiciary is not sufficient. Now more than ever, international donors 
 and Indonesian civil society are critical to providing guidance to reform, and the pressure to see it through. 
PRESENTATION
Kevin Evans on the new House of Representatives
•	 The	large	turnover	in	the	House	(70	percent)	will	make	it	difficult	to	hold	experienced	players	in	the	government	
 to account. The Constitutional Court’s decision last year to move to an open list system did not mean fewer 
 women were elected in the legislative elections (as many feared), but the decision did benefit local candidates. 
 It also represents a move toward greater accountability as representatives will need to make sure their electorate 
 approves of the job they are doing. There remains, however, a ‘democratic deficit’ as the Regional Representative 
 Council (DPD) is an elected body without authority. Finally, the current dispute between the KPK and the 
 National Police highlights the need to move from anti-corruption as only law enforcement to creating a system 
 wherein it is possible to work and be successful without engaging in corruption. 
VZ Upfront
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One month into his second term, President Yudhoyono has accepted the oath 
of all 34 ministers, and installed five deputy ministers and other high-ranking 
officials. Yet one name remains unannounced: three-star Army Lt. Gen. Sjafrie 
Sjamsoeddin, whose poor record on human rights may have sparked opposition 
from the United States.
Sjamsoeddin is current Secretary General of the Ministry of Defense and was on 
track to be the new Cabinet Secretary. Sources from inside the Palace said that 
while President Yudhoyono has signed the decree naming Sjamsoeddin, “it is quite 
uncertain as to when the President will officially announce it.” A source said that 
Sjamsoeddin may instead serve as expert staff dealing with the Cabinet’s day-to-
day activities, which a high level post “but not equal to the ministerial post.”  Such 
a shift, from Cabinet Secretar to expert staff, would be quite a demotion.
Indonesian cabinet structure usually includes two high-ranking state officials to 
deal with state administration and/or cabinet activities. They are Minister of State 
Secretary and Minister of Cabinet Secretary. Previously, the position of Minister of 
State Secretary was held by Hatta Radjasa, while the position of Minister of Cabinet 
Secretary was held by by Silalahi. For the current Cabinet line up, Yudhoyono has 
appointed Radjasa as Coordinating Minister of Economy, and pending Sjamsoeddin’s 
appointment, Silalahi continues handling tasks from his old desk.  
The stalled installment of Sjamsoeddin has sparked speculation that Yudhoyono 
has been reticent to officially inaugurate him following pressure from the United 
States. The US did not issue Sjamsoeddin a visa, effectively blocking him from 
accompaning Yudhoyono to the G-20 meeting in Pittsburgh held in September. 
Sjamsoeddin is a member of Indonesian red berret corps Kopassus – the Army’s 
special forces  which has been linked to a series of past human rights violations. 
Several Kopassus members are believed to have been involved in kidnapping cases 
of pro-democracy activists between 1997 and 1998. Kopassus is also accused of 
being partly responsible for the gross human rights violations before, during, and 
after the UN-sponsored ballot for independent in East Timor in 1999.
Another Kopassus military official was apparently blocked from entering the US 
as well; Maj. Gen. Pramono Edhie Wibowo, the current Kopassus Commander 
and a younger brother of Yudhoyono’s wife, Kristiani Herawati, was registered 
on the list of Yudhoyono’s entourage. Like Sjamsoeddin, Wibowo was prevented 
from visiting the US.
One source told the Report that, after a month of waiting, Sjamsoeddin no longer 
expects he will serve as Cabinet Secretary.
Intelligence
Sjamsoeddin is still on the waiting list
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Coming on the heels of the replacement of three military Chiefs of Staff, President 
Yudhoyono is preparing to shake things up again with plans – possibly taking place 
in the next three months – to replace incumbent Indonesian National Armed Forces 
(TNI) Commander Gen. Djoko Santoso, sources told the Report. The sources 
added that in line with TNI’s principle of rotation, the next TNI commander 
would come from the Navy.
“In the next three months, the newly installed Navy Chief, Vice Admiral Agus 
Suhartono, is likely to replace Santoso as TNI commander. Meanwhile, Suhartono’s 
current post as the Navy Chief will be filled by Rear Admiral Yulianto, who is now 
serving as general planning assistant to the Navy Chief,” said  to the source.
On November 7, the TNI headquarters announced a dramatic reshuffle removing 
three chiefs of staff from each branch of the armed forces:  Army Chief of Staff Gen. 
Agustadi Sasongko Purnomo, who was replaced by Lt. Gen. George Toisutta; Navy 
Chief of Staff Admiral Tedjo Edhie Pudjiatno, who was replaced by Suhartono; and 
Air Force Chief of Staff Marshall Subandrio, who was replaced by Rear Marshall 
Imam Sufaat.
Two days after the announcement, President Yudhoyono officially installed Toisutta, 
Suhartono, and Sufaat at the Presidential Palace. 
“The reshuffle inside the military is needed because the incumbent chiefs of staff 
have met their mandatory retirement age,” said the TNI spokesman Rear Marshall 
Sagom Tambun.
Despite Tambun’s claim that the reshuffle was not sudden or unusual, the timing 
of the reshuffle – amidst political tension triggered by disputes between the 
National Police and the Corruption Eradication Commission KPK- has caused 
much speculation regarding the true motives.  
The timing also seemed odd since, as one Air Force officer cautiously said, “Sufaat 
was still in France when he was told that he should immediately back to Jakarta 
to handover the command batton to his successor.” An officer from the Navy also 
shared news of his colleague: “The new Navy Chief is quite young, he is a 1977 
graduation of the Armed Forces Academy (Akabri).” The two other new Chief of 
Staffs are young as well, having graduated from the Akabri in 1976. Well, perhap 
not “young” in absolute terms, but the three are relatively younger than many of 
their associates who were passed over for the promotion. 
One rumor has it that, a week before the recent reshuffle, some military top brass 
had an informal meeting during which they discussed the leadership of President 
Yudhoyono in the dispute between the National Police and the KPK. The TNI 
authorities, however, have denied that any such meeting took place.  
Many members of the military are also dissatisfied with Yudhoyono’s policies on 
Three Military Chiefs of Staff are replaced; TNI Chief to follow
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defense, including the President’s latest decision to appoint Sutanto, a retired 
police general, to head the National Intelligence Agency (BIN) – an institution 
that has long been dominated by the military. Sutanto replaced Samsir Siregar 
from the Army.
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Special Feature
At the peak of the conflict between the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) 
and the National Police, President Yudhoyono shelved the goal of increasing quality 
growth, including reducing poverty, improving infrastructure, and creating jobs, and 
announced that his primary objective in the first 100 days of his second administration 
would be to dismantle the ‘judicial mafia.’ This ‘mafia’ was said to include those both 
within and outside formal judicial and law enforcement agencies who are involved in 
bribery, blackmail, and witness intimidation. In this issue’s special feature, we focus 
on the reform o f the Indonesian judiciary and the myriad challenges that remain.
In the morning of Tuesday, 21 April 2009 Nasib Karnan was beaten to death by an 
angry crowd in Karawang regency on the outskirts of Jakarta. The 51 year old man 
from the village of Medangasem had stolen three ducks and 20 eggs from his 60 
year old neighbour Alim. Citizens had taken the law into their own hands (main 
hakim sendiri) to punish the thief, according to a newspaper report.1  
While forms and patterns of mob justice are subject to change in Indonesia—in the 
turbulent years after the collapse of Suharto’s dictatorship in 1998 setting thieves 
on fire and burning them to death was de rigeur 2 —‘street courts’ (pengadilan 
jalanan) have existed in the country since at least the authoritarian New Order 
regime was established in 1965.3    
Incidents of main hakim sendiri are indicative of the dismal standing of the 
official legal apparatus in the eyes of ordinary Indonesians. The lack of credibility 
of the judiciary, hence the need to resort to self-justice, is primarily a result of 
the widespread corruption in the legal apparatus. In a comprehensive national 
survey rating state entities according to the degree of corruption conducted by 
the government’s Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) in February 2009, 
the judiciary rated among the lowest, highlighting the woeful image of the court 
system.4  Likewise, an international survey ranked Indonesia’s judiciary last among 
12 other Asian countries, noting that the judiciary is “one of Indonesia’s weakest 
and most controversial institutions and many consider the poor enforcement of 
laws to be the country’s number one problem.”5
Present day’s systemic graft and abuse of legal powers in Indonesia are the result 
of a gradual decline of judicial integrity that had started in the late 1950s. 
While Indonesia had a reasonable legal system in the immediate post-independence 
years, the politicisation of state institutions during Guided Democracy from 
1959-1966 and the subsequent collapse of oversight mechanisms resulted in 
The ‘judicial mafia’ and judicial reform in Indonesia*
* This special feature was provided by Michael Buehler, Postdoctoral Fellow in Modern Southeast Asian 
Studies at Columbia University in New York. He can be reached at mb3120@columbia.edu
1 ’Mencuri Bebek, Karnan Tewas Dikeroyok Massa’, Kompas, 22 April 2009, 27. 
2 ‘Trial by Fire: Taking the law into your own hands is now commonplace in urban areas in Indonesia’, Inside 
Indonesia, Jul-Sept 2004, online. Available at http:///www.insideindonesia.org
3 ‘Dilarang Main Hakim Sendiri”, Kompas,, 4 January 1966, 3. 
4 ‘Judiciary the worst in graft: KPK survey’, The Jakarta Post, 5 February 2009. 
5 ‘Judicial Independence a Myth: Lawyer’, The Jakarta Globe, 26 February 2009. 
Van Zorge Report      November 25, 2009 
11
widespread corruption, collusion and nepotism. These unfortunate dynamics were 
only reinforced by the kleptocratic New Order regime under President Suharto. 
While structural limits to the independence of Indonesian judges were added. 
By the end of Suharto’s reign in 1998, Indonesia’s judiciary had lost all integrity. 
Reasonably functioning legal mechanisms had been replaced by the rule of a ‘judicial 
mafia’ consisting of judges colluding with prosecutors and private advocates.
Promises of reform
Since 1998, the Government of Indonesia has embarked on a path of law reforms 
triggered by both domestic and foreign pressure. While law reforms under Suharto’s 
predecessor Habibie were primarily aimed at bringing the country’s economic 
regulatory framework in line with demands from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), they also included reform initiatives aimed at the demilitarization of the police 
forces, a true separation of judicial and executive powers, constitutional reform and 
the implementation of various initiatives that led to greater democratisation and, 
at least on paper, the revaluation of human rights. Habibie’s follower, Abdurahman 
Wahid adopted various reforms directly aimed at the judiciary, including salary 
rises for judges, higher budget allocations for courts and the appointment of ad 
hoc judges from outside the judiciary to Supreme Court positions. Various strategy 
papers for long term legal reforms were also issued during the Wahid presidency. 
However, due to the erratic nature of Wahid’s leadersip, the momentum for legal 
reform had abated by the time Megawati Sukarnoputri became president in 
2001. Nevertheless, it was during Megawati’s tenure that an independent Judicial 
Commission, a Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and a Corruption 
Crimes Court were established.6    
The election of President Yudhoyono in 2004 reinvigorated judicial reform as he 
came to power with the pledge to implement an ambitious reform agenda. Rigorous 
anti-corruption initiatives as well as the improvement of Indonesia’s dire human 
rights record were the main promises he made. Indeed, soon after taking power 
the Yudhoyono administration introduced measures to reform the legal system, 
raise judicial standards and tighten law enforcement. Consequently, parts of the 
judiciary have become more assertive in recent years. Especially the Constitutional 
Court has become increasingly vocal since its establishment in 2003.
Vested interests prevent the implementation of laudable reform initiatives
However, vested interests within the judiciary have managed to resist the 
implementation of many reform efforts. The aforementioned Judicial Commission, 
for example, which was established in August 2001 with a mandate to supervise 
judges and prevent corruption in the judiciary, was stripped of its oversight 
powers in a Constitutional Court decision in 2006. The court argued that the 
investigatory power would affect the independence of judges when deciding cases. 
6  Timothy Lindsey and Mas Achmad Santosa. 2008. ‘The trajectory of law reform in Indonesia: A short 
overview of legal systems and change in Indonesia’ In Timothy Lindsey. Ed. Indonesia: Law and Society, 2nd 
edition, Sidney: The Federation Press, 2-22.  
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This significantly lowered the potential to promote a fair, clean and transparent 
judiciary.7 It is now the House of Representatives (DPR) that is responsible for 
the appointment of Supreme Court judges, while the aforementioned Judicial 
Commission is merely responsible for preselecting justice candidates. This provides 
political parties with the leverage to transmit their vested interests to the Supreme 
Court by selecting candidates they deem to be sympathetic to their cause.
Reforms aimed at the Office of the Attorney General have not been very successful 
either. The implementation of state authority over prosecutions is conducted by 
the Attorney General based in Jakarta, high prosecutor in each provincial capital 
and prosecutors in each regency and municipality, according to Articles 3-4 in Law 
No 16/2004. However, a weak regulatory framework, non-compliance of parties 
and law-enforcement officers as well as low capacity of the prosecutor’s office all 
pose challenges to prosecutorial independence.
The current Attorney General’s Office suffers not only from chronic mismanagement 
but also leadership failure. In September 2009, Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW), 
a Jakarta based watchdog organization, requested President Yudhoyono to replace 
the current Attorney General Hendarman Supandji as he had “misled the direction 
of the country’s antigraft campaign.”8 In 2008, an ICW report showed that the 
Office of the Attorney General handed down unusually light sentences in many 
anti-corruption trials under its responsibility.9 It was also under Hendarman’s tenure 
that the Attorney General’s Office adopted a controversial policy of not detaining 
graft suspects if they agreed to return the stolen money. Hendarman Supandji’s 
integrity suffered another blow when, in early 2009, he provided strategic posts 
to two senior prosecutors who were both implicated in a bribery scandal in 2008.
Another ICW survey conducted in nine provinces had shown that only 3.5 percent 
of the graft suspects charged by district prosecutors were from higher echelons 
in the Indonesian bureaucracy or the upper management in the private sector.10  
Overall, well-connected suspects have a good chance to walk free. In February 
2009, for example, Hutomo Suharto, second son of former President Suharto, won 
a district court case in a case brought by the Ministry of Finance. This verdict was 
just the latest in a series of legal battles that were won by members of the former 
New Order oligarchy. In February 2008, Attorney General Hendarman Supandji 
announced that he ceased the investigation of wrongdoing in the asset evaluation 
process for two major borrowers of Bank Indonesia Liquidity Assistance (BLBI) 
in 2000, the Salim and Gadjah Tunggal Group. A few months earlier, the Attorney 
General’s Office had announced that it would close the investigation in alleged 
7 Simon Butt. 2009. ‘The Constitutional Court’s Decision in the Dispute between the Supreme Court and 
the Judicial Commission: Banishing Judicial Accountability?’ In: Ross, McLeod and Andrew MacIntyre, 
Indonesia: Democracy and the Promise of Good Governance. ISEAS: Singapore, 188-190. 
8 ‘Antigraft Body Demands New Attorney General’, The Jakarta Globe, 7 September 2009. 
9 Indonesia Corruption Watch. 2008. ‘Pengadilan Umum: “Kuburan” Pemberantasan Korupsi’, online. 
Available at http://www.antikorupsi.org
10 ‘Antigraft Body Demands New Attorney General’, The Jakarta Globe, 7 September 2009.
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illegal logging activities of the Sinar Mas and Raja Garuda Mas groups in Riau 
province. These were by no means isolated incidents. Between 2007 and 2009 
alone, the Office of the Attorney General had cleared business tycoons such as 
Tan Kian, former Pertamina executives Ariffi Nawawi and Alfred Rohimone, and 
former minister Laksamana Sukardi of corruption charges. This demonstrated that 
the ancient Greek poet Solon’s saying that laws are like spider webs, they catch the 
fly but let the hawk go free, is very true in Indonesia.
Judicial reform has also somewhat stalled with regard to the Supreme Court. 
For example, personnel changes of the past few years, such as the appointment 
of Harifin Tumpa as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in early 2009, do 
not bode well for reform prospects of this branch of the judiciary. Tumpa was 
investigated for wrong-doings while in office in 2006.11 In a further setback, the 
House of Representatives approved a legal amendment in December 2008 that 
rose the retirement age for Supreme Court judges from 65 to 70 years. Given the 
extent of corruption allegations and the slow pace of reform within the Supreme 
Court, the regeneration of court personnel should have been an urgent priority.12
Corruption eradication
President Yudhoyono came to power in 2004 on the promise to weed out corrupt 
practices in Indonesia’s bureaucracy and to improve the country’s human rights 
record. Looking at the KPK’s work alone, it looks like the Yudhoyono government 
delivered. In several hundred cases the KPK, the Corruption Crimes Court and the 
Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) have achieved a number of high-profile successes, 
including governors and general election commissioners. They have also prosecuted 
public officials and ruling party members for the abuse of power. In August 2008, 
for example, the KPK commenced the corruption trial of a Foreign Ministry 
official, Slamet Hidayat who was ambassador in Singapore in 2003-2004.13 Courts 
have upheld jail sentences in several appeals from jailed corruptors.14 However, the 
KPK, the most effective investigative body regarding corruption in Indonesia, is 
handling between 12 and 30 percent of all corruption cases in the country and 
therefore makes a relatively modest contribution to the law enforcement statistics.15 
11  In February 2006, the independent Judicial Commission recommended investigations on 13 Supreme 
Court justices, including Tumpa, due to signs of wrongdoing. See, ‘No change expected at Supreme Court’, 
The Jakarta Post, 17 January 2009. 
12 There are 10 Supreme Court judges that would have retired in 2009 but will now serve until 2012. See, 
‘Supreme Court Draft Law’, Tempo Magazine, No. 12/IX, 23-29 December 2008. 
13 ‘Suspect Ambassador accuses Ambassador to the U.S. of Graft’, The Jakarta Post, 26 November 2008.    
14 In May 2008, the Jakarta High Court upheld a ten-year sentence for the Megawati-era head of the State 
Logistics Agency (Bulog) Widjanarko Puspoyo. In November 2008, the former Gadjah Tunggal Group 
executive Artalyata Suryani appealed to the Jakarta High Court trying to reduce his five-year jail sentence he 
received for bribing a state prosecutor. The appeal was dismissed.
15 Stewart Fenwick, “Measuring up? Indonesia’s Anti-Corruption Commission and the new corruption 
agenda”, In Tim Lindsey (ed)., Indonesia: Law and Society, 2nd Edition, ISEAS: Singapore (2008), 414. The 
bulk of corruption cases are handled by prosecutorial offices across Indonesia. In fact,even the much lauded 
Corruption Eradication Court has handed down light charges in some cases against public officials and ruling 
party actors. The former Gadjah Tunggal Group executive Artalyata Suryani was sentenced to five years in 
prison in July 2008, a charge denounced by many Anti-Corruption groups as too light.
14
Other investigative bodies are less efficient. The Ombudsman Commission, created 
in 2000 by a presidential regulation to receive and process reports on disappointing 
public services, has not been as effective in addressing corruption and promoting 
good governance as hoped. Over its eight years of operation, “it has…been hampered 
by a loss of national support, initially evidenced by a lack of government funding 
and, later by a continual shift in the legislative focus from one new anti-corruption 
institution to another”. 16
Likewise, the Supreme Audit Agency, an independent constitutional agency, which 
supervises the state budget, has underperformed. Under the new rules established 
after the collapse of the New Order in 1998, the head of the Supreme Audit Agency 
is elected by its members to prevent the appointment of government cronies. 
To prevent domination by Jakarta based elites, the Supreme Audit Agency is to 
have offices in every province.17 While the Supreme Audit Agency has addressed 
various cases of misconduct in the past few years, it has not been without its own 
corruption scandals, showing the endemic nature of corruption, collusion and 
nepotism in Indonesian society.18 Unfortunately, some of the new members of the 
Supreme Audit Agency who were took office in October 2009 are controversial. 
Hari Purnomo, the new Supreme Audit Agency Chair, for example, served a 
six-year stint as director-general for taxation before he was removed by reform-
minded Finance Minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati in December 2005 on allegations 
of corruption and abuse of power in the office under this control.
In short, the large bulk of power-abuse by public officials and party cadres 
in Indonesia continues to go unpunished, especially if they are high-up 
in the political pecking order. This is part of a larger political culture as was aptly 
shown by the fact that legislative and executive governments have refrained from 
casting blame on members of the political establishment for abuse of power in 
recent years.19 
 
Human Rights
Some progress has been made with regard to improving the human rights situation 
in Indonesia in recent years. An important law on human trafficking was adopted 
in 2007, followed by efforts to raise public awareness of the issue.  
However, the broader picture looks less encouraging. Torture and human rights 
abuses are a daily reality in the archipelago state. While victims of torture can 
submit complaints to the police this occurs only rarely due to the low reputation 
16  Melissa Crouch, ‘Indonesia’s national and local Ombudsman reforms: Salvaging a failed experiment?’, In: 
Timothy Lindsey. Ed. 2008, Indonesia: Law and Society, 2nd Edition, ISEAS: Singapore, 386.
17  Tim Lindsey and Mas Achmad Santosa, ‘The trajectory of law reform in Indonesia: A short overview 
of legal systems and change in Indonesia’, In: Timothy Lindsey. Ed. 2008, Indonesia: Law and Society, 2nd 
Edition, ISEAS: Singapore, 36.
18  ‘State auditor named as corruption suspect’, The Jakarta Post, 14 February 2009. 
19  In February 2008, for example, the national parliament refrained from casting blame on the Bakrie Group 
for the Sidoarjo Mud Extrusion, one of Indonesian’s biggest environmental disasters. The Bakrie Group is 
under the control of Aburizal Bakrie, the current Golkar chairman. 
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of the organisation. In fact, the police and the military are frequently involved in 
human rights abuses. The police often fail to bring prisoners before a judge, and 
prisoners can be held in custody for up to two months without charges. Some 
detainees are not registered at all. 
Internal oversight mechanisms the Yudhoyono administration set up in recent years 
are toothless. In 2005, for example, a National Police Commission (Kompolnas) 
was formed with the task to investigate cases in which police personnel had carried 
out abuse. However, in June 2008, the commission publicly admitted that it had 
failed to boost the performance of the police force due to a lack of formal powers.20 
The National Police Commission essentially remains a paper tiger with no authority 
to investigate or detain people. Impunity for police and military officers involved 
in torture is the norm.21
At the same time, the authority, independence and capacity of the National Human 
Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) remain severely limited. The commission 
is currently not capable of conducting preliminary inquiries into all allegations of 
torture and ill-treatment because of its limited resources and weak mandate. The 
inability to bring the culprits behind the slaying of human rights activists Munir 
Said Thalib to justice until present provides example and evidence of the weak role 
the National Human Rights Commission plays in Indonesian politics. The handling 
of the Munir case is one of the major failures of the Yudhoyono administration and 
emblematic of the fact that the current Government of Indonesia has not resolved 
a number of substantive issues with regard to human rights.22  
Overall, the situation has not turned for the better regarding human rights abuses in 
Indonesia. In fact, only in October 2009, the National Human Rights Commission 
reported that human rights defenders in Indonesia were increasingly being reported 
to the police, accused of lies, defamation, and criminal acts.23
Taking stock 
To summarise, after five years of Yudhoyono leadership, the Indonesian judiciary 
remains unreformed and highly susceptible to economic and political pressures. 
Misconduct and unprofessional behavior by judges are rarely followed up. 
In March 2008 the Judicial Commission reported it had received 1556 reports of 
misconduct by judges in 2008 alone. The Judicial Commission examined 212 
cases and recommended 27 cases to be followed up by the Supreme Court. The 
Supreme Court did not scrutinise a single case. 
20  “Police Commission says it is a toothless tiger”, The Jakarta Post, (4 June 2008).
21  “Indonesia: Briefing to the UN Committee against torture”, Amnesty International, (April 2008), online. 
Available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?lang=e&id=ENGASA210032008, 38.
22  Human Rights  Watch, “Indonesia: Refocus Efforts to Solve Activist’s Murder—Alleged Criminal 
Defamation the Wrong Approach to Munir Killing”, (11 September 2009), online. Available at http://www.
hrw.org 
23  Indria Fernida, “Protecting Human Rights Defenders in Indonesia”, (23 October 2009), online. Available 
at http://www.upiasia.com
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One of the main reasons for the low integrity and quality among Indonesia’s judges 
is the country’s weak career development system. The low pay and lack of adequate 
retirement contingency of many judges is a key factor in maintaining a system of 
endemic corruption. Only minor reforms have occurred in this respect over the past 
years. In April 2008, President Yudhoyono issued Presidential Regulation (Perpres) 
No 19/2008 on special merit-based stipends for the judiciary. The regulation created 
a new stipend that ensured adequate take-home salary for judicial system employees 
if their performance meets certain criteria. This step towards judicial reform will 
only be successful, however, with an overall improvement of accountability and 
transparency of the judiciary. At present, there is still a lack of adequate instruments 
for assessing judicial performance and quality. Overall, incentive structures in the 
judiciary remain largely unchanged from the New Order era. 
At the same time, transparency and accountability continue to lose out to corruption, 
collusion and nepotism. Indonesia’s anti-corruption initiative is currently under severe 
attack. Perhaps in a reaction to the Corruption Eradication Commission strategy 
of increasingly targeting high level politicians and bureaucrats, the House passed 
an Anti-Corruption Court Law in September 2009 which significantly weakened 
the KPK. The new law authorizes the heads of courts to alter the composition of 
judicial panels on the Corruption Crimes Court. Career judges, rather than ad 
hoc judges, may comprise the majority of such panels in the future. The previous 
law on the KPK ensured that panels consisted predominantly of ad hoc judges, 
recruited from outside the graft-ridden Indonesian judiciary. Furthermore, the 
legal training judges get prior to their professional careers is of low quality. Math 
Noortmann, a legal expert at the Erasmus University in Rotterdam described 
the quality of legal education in Indonesia as ‘disastrous’ in a recent interview. 
Teaching methods are dull, mostly limited to lecturing, while large class sizes render 
discussion impossible. The emphasis is on memorizing facts rather than developing 
professional skills. At the same time, professors at many Indonesian law faculties 
are absent and due to their low salaries engaged in advising governmental and non-
governmental agencies. Currently, there is no momentum for a reform of the legal 
education system. Finally, access to justice is fraught with problems, especially for 
poor Indonesians. Only between 10 and 17 percent of poor Indonesians have the 
ability to bring their cases to the courts, according to recent estimates.24  
In November 2009, President Yudhoyono promised to make the fight against 
‘judicial mafias’ his top priority for action in the first 100 days of his second-term 
as President of Indonesia. Given the dismal state of the judiciary in Indonesia after 
five years of SBY leadership, it is high time to deliver on such promises and to 
ensure the creation of a legal environment in which duck-thieves get fined instead 
of being flogged to death by angry mobs.  
24 ‘Most poor Indonesians cannot afford cost of civil justice’, The Jakarta Post, 31 July 2009; Adnan Buyung. 
2007. Nasution, Arus pemikiran konstitutionalisme, Jakarta: Kata.   
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Sebastiaan Pompe is program manager of the National 
Legal Reform Program (NLRP), which is funded by the 
Government of the Netherlands and administered by the 
International Monetary Fund. He is also the author of 
The Indonesian Supreme Court: A Study of Institutional 
Collapse. The Report sat down with Sebastiaan Pompe 
to hear his thoughts on politics and the judiciary, and the 
long road to reform.*
Van Zorge Report:  What is your overall assessment of 
judicial reform in the last 5 years?
Sebastiaan Pompe: In 1998, the 
judiciary received everything 
they had been asking for over 
the previous 50 years, which 
was power, independence and 
status. On the issue of power, they 
got a constitutional court with 
powers of judicial review. On the 
issue of independence, judicial 
independence was constitutional 
enshrined (which it was not previously). In addition, the 
judiciary was given administrative self-management under 
what is called the ‘one-roof system,’ which was enshrined 
in law in 2001 and effected in 2005. Finally, as regards 
status, the judiciary received a dollop of money with a 
structural budget increase.
Even though there is general agreement that this is a very 
good thing, one may question the wisdom of some of 
these measures, notably the one-roof system which is self-
management in financial, administrative and personnel 
terms. Some argued that giving an unreformed judiciary 
such wide budgetary and other controls actually gave up 
all outside reform leverage, and thus basically killed the 
reform dynamic. Also, judiciaries tend to be endemically 
weak on management, and implementation has become 
a very major issue. It is important to recognise that 
the one-roof system is a response in Indonesia against 
dictatorship, under which it was through personnel, budget 
and administration that the executive interfered in the 
course of justice. This means the judiciary in Indonesia 
today is very independent, in formal terms much more 
independent than in many other countries. 
There has also been an increase in facilities. The Indonesian 
judiciary has always craved an increase in budgets and 
salaries and it received a very significant budget and salary 
increase in the past two years. Overall, the judiciary is 
much better equipped than it was 5 to 7 years ago. 
This is also a result of the introduction of the one-
roof system. Under the two-
roof system, in which the 
Department of Justice was 
handling the administration of 
courts, the amount of money 
that was left for the judiciary 
after the budget was creamed-
off by the Department of Justice 
was pretty meager. The one-
roof system has taken out this 
extra-bureaucratic layer as the 
budget is allocated directly by the government to the 
judiciary. All in all, if you look at the systemic changes 
that have been implemented since 1998, there has been 
a net improvement in constitutional terms, in terms of 
independence, in terms of power, and in terms of status.
VZR: What are the main obstacles for judicial reform?
SP: There are a number of major challenges. One is the 
broad area of internal operations. The Americans, the
This means the judiciary 
in Indonesia today is 
very independent, in 
formal terms much more 
independent than in 
many other countries.
Interview
* The interview was conducted by Michael Buehler and transcribed by Endah Asnari, a language instructor and translator based in Jakarta. She can be 
reached at endahasnari82@gmail.com.
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European Union and the Australians have heavily invested 
in internal operations in Indonesia, but it continues to 
be an area of major concern. There is no good record 
keeping of cases and staff, there are no good methods for 
budgeting, there is a major gap in relating budgeting to 
staff and workload, and there is a very major issue in the 
area of responsiveness
There is a policy plan [9 Blueprints for judicial reform] 
that addresses these issues which was developed by the 
institution in close cooperation with civil society. It is 
not a self-serving plan but a plan that reflects societal 
aspirations and input. These plans cover a whole range 
of issues. There is heavy civil society involvement, which 
is great and does not happen in many other countries. 
Implementation assessments have been conducted of these 
plans and the implementation 
is around 30 to 40 percent, 
which is not bad as they were 
very ambitious plans. Currently, 
there are efforts underway to 
update those plans and renew 
their focus, again with heavy 
civil society involvement.
The other area of major concern 
is that for all the changes, for all 
the problem recognition and 
society involvement, for all the massive funds that have 
gone into this enterprise, service delivery continues to 
be very poor.
It is important to recognize that these institutional reform 
processes never are very easy. Typically, judicial reform 
of any significance in OECD countries takes at least 
10 years.  These challenges are also very complicated, in 
part because they often are not solely within the power 
of the judiciary to resolve. I just mentioned budgeting. 
A court, for example, in Indonesia is not a legal entity. 
Indonesian financial regulations prohibit non-legal 
entities from having a bank account. Now, how does 
each court then handle its household funds? Or if there 
is an order against a defendant to pay damages but the 
plaintiff is of unknown abode, how does the court hold 
such payments if it cannot have a bank account? Because 
of this, courts have to use ‘curious’ instruments to handle 
financial issues because the law does not allow otherwise. 
So, even before talking about corruption, there are many 
technical issues that are not easy to resolve and that the 
court cannot resolve itself because they depend on other 
government entities such as the Department of Finance, 
or on the legislative process. 
I am somewhat reluctant to say that the court does not 
reform at all. After all, it is addressing a whole range of 
issues that have developed over a period of 30 to 40 years. 
Nevertheless, at the very end, service delivery is really poor. 
It is also poor in terms of access. Indonesia has very little 
litigation. They had a lot of litigation in the 1950s, but 
now, figures are significantly lower: There is no societal 
trust in service delivery and court decisions command 
little respect even with government agencies. It is not just 
a court issue. Even if you have 
a court document and you are 
going to the authorities to have 
it enforced, the authorities do 
not seem to be very impressed 
with court orders. 
Again, poor service delivery 
might not all have to do with the 
courts. It might have to do with 
the way legal court documents are 
viewed in the Indonesian state 
system, and a military heritage which never really valued 
legal documents. But even with that, the unpredictability 
of the courts, the inward looking nature of the institution, 
the way courts apply legal norms that local society has 
little sympathy for…are all responsible for the fact that 
the courts are still used very rarely overall. Indonesian 
courts have about the same case load of New Zealand, 
which has around 4 or 5 million inhabitants. Indonesian 
litigation used to be twice as high in the 1950s from 
what it is currently. So, it is not because Indonesians do 
not like to litigate but because the circumstances have 
deteriorated. All in all, the judiciary is still struggling to 
make itself a credible, dependable party. We are talking 
about the mainstream judiciary here; the general courts. 
The constitutional court is a different story and has been 
exemplary in itself.  
VZR:  In what ways is the constitutional court exemplary?
Since 1998, there has been 
a net improvement in 
constitutional terms, in 
terms of independence, 
in terms of power, and in 
terms of status.
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SP:  The constitutional court in so many ways has been 
exemplary. Not only in some of the decisions it has issued 
in the areas of civil rights, one example is the right for 
former members of the communist party to participate in 
elections, but it is also the fact that decisions are getting 
published the moment they are issued and the decisions 
are accessible in English; it is a very accessible institution. 
They try to have a visit from school children every day. 
In so many ways, it is a visionary court. There has not 
been even a whiff of corruption. The importance of the 
Constitutional Court is in the way it shows that things 
can change. It proves the skeptics wrong.
VZR:  What are the other major obstacles?
SP: After internal operations and poor service delivery, 
the final point of concern is 
that corruption in the judiciary 
continues pretty much unabated. 
The information I am getting 
is that corruption prevails in 
the judiciary as it did before 
the reforms were started. It is 
pervasive. In certain transactions 
it is quite sizeable. It is pervasive 
also in terms of participants: 
The number of parties that are 
involved in corruption continues 
to be high. Integrity continues to be a very major concern. 
The increase in salaries for judges has lifted the incentives 
to some extent. There is less need for corruption and also 
the moral justification for corruption can no longer be 
used. Things are shifting but as you know you cannot 
out-compete corruption.
It is not necessarily driven by the judiciary alone but also 
by larger outside interests. There is an understanding 
developing that corruption is not necessarily driven by 
these institutions but by broader interests such as powerful 
politicians and entrepreneurs and lawyers that are acting 
on their behalf. The judiciary to some extent is on the 
receiving end. Yet even if it is not necessarily a prompter, 
it is a willing party. 
This said, even in the old days there used to be parts of 
the judiciary that were honest. Usually women, by the 
way, because they used to have high earning husbands 
so they did not depend on their income…and they also 
saw it as an intellectual exercise to remain non-corrupt. 
That group I think has currently expanded somewhat, 
perhaps in part because of the impact in the incentive 
structures due to the salary increases. But the power 
politics remain and more important than such individual 
transactions is the way these networks work.
The key to working in the current political environment in 
Indonesia is to not be exposed [to the power politics]. There 
are very powerful networks of  lawyers and entrepreneurs 
built up within legal institutions and those networks 
are beholden to these larger companies and corporate 
interests. These are networks that have been built up over 
many years and they continue to flourish. 
VZR:  Are these networks rooted 
in the New Order? 
SP: No, I think they are rooted in 
current politics and economics. 
I know of junior judges now 
being recruited who worked 
for corporations before they 
joined the judiciary. In fact, 
they were deliberately dumped 
by corporations in the judiciary 
to work as their agents. Those networks have been built 
up over a period of 15 to 20 years and they continue to 
build them up. It is the way the system works. It is not a 
simple direct transaction between a lawyer or a company 
and the judiciary. Outsiders make the judiciary service 
their needs by parachuting in their agents. These agents 
basically work as middlemen between the outsiders and 
the judiciary, or the AGO [Attorney General’s Office] 
for that matter as recent events made amply clear. Many 
of these agents are prosecutors or judges and receive a 
monthly salary from these outsiders. 
VZR: Against this backdrop, how would you assess the 
impartiality of the Indonesian judiciary, especially interference 
by the executive government? How does the situation look 
at the local level?
SP:  Formally, they are very impartial and certainly meet 
After internal operations 
and poor service delivery, 
the final point of concern 
is that corruption in the 
judiciary continues pretty 
much unabated.
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international standards. In reality, there are a number of 
elements that conspire against such impartiality. One factor 
is excessive hierarchy and discretion in the way powers 
are used. The fact that the chief justice can summarily 
order a judge from one place to another is an enormous 
power that can be abused easily. For example, you are in 
a comfortable position in the big city and then you are 
getting transferred to a little place in the middle of the 
jungle. So excessive hierarchy and discretionary powers 
coupled with relatively insecure positions of judges is 
undermining impartiality. Internal independence, in 
other words, is an issue. 
Another issue is budgeting. 
Despite the significant budget 
increases, local courts often still 
suffer from budget shortage, 
particularly on infrastructure. 
So you have a local court 
building, but electricity is an 
issue. And local governments 
often contribute to the funding 
of court buildings. But since local 
governments are often parties in 
local disputes, the cosponsoring 
of local court buildings does raise 
fundamental issues about the 
impartiality of local courts. There 
is an implicit quid pro quo. There are structural factors, in 
other words, that make this independence complicated. 
VZR:  Has the situation worsened with decentralisation?
SP: According to Indonesian law, there should be an appeal 
court in each province and a district court in each district. 
As new provinces and new districts are being established, 
they wish for courts. It happens that, as a result of this 
decentralization drive, existing jurisdictions with a small 
case load are split up amongst 3-4 new jurisdictions, 
each having an even smaller workload. It is a ridiculous 
situation. It is one of these operational problems that need 
to be changed. Local governments do not see themselves 
as mature until they have a court. They want the whole 
apparatus of local government and in their view this 
includes a court, even though in fact local courts are not 
part of the local government but continue to be part of 
the central government. The situation can become quite 
silly. In West Java, for example, the province has been 
divided up into three new entities. So you often find 
the situation where one inefficient court (i.e, with few 
cases) is divided into five or six even less efficient courts 
which must be furnished with judges and budgets from 
the central judiciary.
 There is a tension between the judiciary and decentralisation 
in budgetary and personnel terms. This is a management 
issue rooted in inadequate laws and poor thinking. The 
judiciary also still has this military mind-set that in order 
to be important you need to be 
big. The whole logic within the 
judiciary is still towards largeness. 
Therefore, they also continue to 
recruit judges indiscriminately. 
Currently, the judiciary recruits 
around 500 judges each year even 
though they actually have hardly 
any work for them. There has 
been an attempt to cut back on 
recruitment but recruitment in 
Indonesia furnishes an industry. 
The former chief justice tried to 
curb recruitment but he has not 
been able to hold his ground. 
Everything is defined in terms 
of sizes and numbers. 
They just built a new training facility in the hills of 
Ciawi, which is beautiful. It is one of the most beautiful 
training facilities in the world. It is a training facility for 
1200 candidate judges. Does Indonesia actually need 
1200 candidate judges? Nobody seems to have asked this 
question. The whole facility that sustains this recruitment 
logic is inefficient in its own right. There was once a plan 
to do workload assessment for judges that drives the 
performance budgeting logic which was aligning staff 
with workload. The report has been kept confidential 
because it showed a massive disconnect between the staff 
and the workload. The report has not had any impact on 
recruitment practices. In fact, the Indonesian judiciary 
continues to recruit as before even now they know that 
there is this disconnect between staff numbers and 
workload. It is outrageous.
They also continue 
to recruit judges 
indiscriminately. 
Currently, the 
judiciary recruits 
around 500 judges each 
year even though they 
actually have hardly 
any work for them.
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I am unhappy with the 
100 percent conviction 
rate of the Corruption 
Crimes Court. Everyone 
here in Indonesia is quite 
happy with it, but it comes 
across much like the 
Stalinist courts.
civil society organizations, which are clever, articulate, 
astute and with a sustained commitment, can achieve 
considerable traction, as history shows.
VZR:  Do you see this politicisation of the judiciary also 
happening with regard to the Corruption Crimes Court?
 
SP: I do not believe in state 
capture in Indonesia. The 
reason is not that there is no 
state capturing going on, but 
that there is actually a herd of 
elephants. In Russia you might 
have one or two elephant, here 
in Indonesia there’s a herd. 
There are a number of large 
conglomerates and power 
blocks in Indonesia and I do 
not think any one can exert the 
amount of control that you have 
in places like Russia. There is enormous influence of big 
entrepreneurs and others but it is a fragmenting process 
which creates constant competition. The current conflict 
between the KPK and the Police assuredly suggests that 
there is mischief going on, but it also shows that no-
one is fully controls the script. 
Because of this competition 
you create room to maneuver. 
The KPK and the Corruption 
Crimes Court have a fair room 
to maneuver. The state has a 
fair room to maneuver which 
is enhanced by the democratic 
process. You have 70 percent 
of parliamentarians being 
newly elected politicians and 
this creates a different power 
dynamic than you would not 
have through indirect elections. So, there is actually an 
active creation of this space for maneuvering. 
The current Corruption Crimes Court in many ways has 
been an exemplary court. Its format (with ad hoc judges), 
its track record in highly contentious cases involving high 
profile suspects, has been outstanding. It is another court 
free from corruption, and to have achieved this is high 
VZR:  But isn’t that also a problem of the donor industry. 
Many do not have that much of an interest in what the 
actual impact of their work is. I think the incentive structures 
in many donor agencies are actually not so much different 
from the Indonesian bureaucracy. 
Obviously, donors are to some 
extent dictated by the situation. 
There are elements in the donor 
industry that are have been 
quite critical such as the Asia 
Foundation, but of course 
there are less critical elements. 
But make no mistake, all these 
institutions that are now so 
admired, or in which so much 
hope is now vested, such as the 
Anti Corruption Commission 
[KPK], the Judicial Commission, 
the Anti Corruption Court, came 
about with donor assistance, and sometimes against the 
wishes of the existing government. 
Those Blueprints for judicial reform, which is the 
only credible roadmap to judicial reform, was solely 
donor supported – much as 
the Blueprints for Attorney 
General’s Office reform. It is the 
donors that make it possible for 
Indonesian civil society to sit 
within the Supreme Court or 
the AGO, and relentlessly chip 
away at the block from within 
the institution. That support 
and intervention may not be 
much apparent to outsiders. It 
is delicate in that processes often 
are intrinsically constitutional, 
but it has been instrumental absolutely. There are major 
battles being fought, not just on the streets, but within 
institutions. To rubricate donors to supporters of the 
status quo categorically misreads the situation. There 
are nuances between programs, obviously, and I for one 
have been a strong supporter of an engagement that is 
more ambitious and drives at structural adjustments. 
But particularly the programs that engage Indonesian 
A point of concern with 
the KPK is the degree to 
which seconded officers 
from the Police and AGO 
control the investigation 
and prosecution process of 
the Commission.
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octane corruption cases is a feat. The new law on the anti-
corruption court, which establishes 33 new Corruption 
Crimes Courts and reduces the role of the ad hoc judges, 
basically ends up destroying the effective law enforcement 
in corruption cases. The law is an enormous set-back and 
is a vicious parting shot of the tainted old Parliament; 
and they knew it because the 
bill involved heavy wrangling 
with civil society right up to the 
final minutes. 
 Sure, the Corruption Crimes 
Court is not perfect. I am 
unhappy with the 100 percent 
conviction rate of the Corruption 
Crimes Court. Everyone here in 
Indonesia is quite happy with it, 
but it comes across much like the 
Stalinist courts. I know some of 
the defendants quite well. Or, 
let’s say, I know some of the witnesses quite well, which is 
really the pre-defendant stage, and I can tell you that the 
measures used by the KPK are draconic. Many of their 
measures would not pass the rule of law test. That is for 
sure. Such as withholding a passport of a witness for one 
year: When a witness has a job abroad, this assuredly is a 
violation of human rights. 
A point of concern with the KPK is the degree to which 
seconded officers from the Police and AGO control the 
investigation and prosecution process of the Commission. 
It exposes the Commission to interference from within. I 
was heavily involved in the drafting process of the KPK Bill 
before it was sent to Parliament. One of the very specific 
points in that process was that the KPK should recruit 
its own investigative and prosecution personnel, and that 
secondment [i.e. placement of officers] from the other law 
enforcement agencies would not be permitted. It drew 
on the experience of the predecessor agency to the KPK, 
called the Joint Investigating Team ( JIT). The Team was 
housed at the Attorney General’s Office and there were 
strong rumours that the AGO support staff to the JIT 
tailored the files before sending them up, resulting in a 
zero conviction rate. So when the KPK Bill was discussed, 
efforts were focused on cutting the institutional ties with 
the Police and AGO. 
As developments show, the AGO and Police managed to 
pull themselves back in, referring to their own laws that gave 
them authority in investigations and prosecutions, but even 
more so because key Commissioners within the KPK were 
quite willing to open the door. Currently, investigations 
and prosecutions by the KPK are virtually monopolized 
by those old agencies. From that 
angle, it is actually curious the 
current conflict could arise at all.
VZR:  Do you see a real chance 
to address these issues or is it 
pretty futile as long as the broader 
patterns of politics in Indonesia 
do not change?
JP: I strongly doubt whether 
there is sufficient political will 
to change things in the judiciary. 
The large political and private 
sector players find the judiciary quite appealing in its 
current format. There is a lot of talk about anti corruption, 
which is important in that it creates a moral and political 
compass. It shapes generally shared ideas on what is right 
and what is wrong, and what we should aim for. And 
much the same can be said about such cornerstones of a 
democratic state, such as the rule of law or the independence 
of the judiciary. That public discourse matters. Diverging 
from that line, challenging those concepts, really puts 
you off the map of political discourse. That is important. 
But there is a massive gap with reality. The fact is major 
players find the current situation quite convenient because 
it serves them. I do not think there is a serious commitment 
to strengthen the rule of law. Many people say there is but 
I do not see it. Of course, this is not a simple horizontal 
divide: The cracks run right up to the top, and within the 
highest echelons of government there are persons highly 
committed to strengthening the rule of law. Minister 
Sri Mulyani’s track record is phenomenal, particularly 
if you know what she has been up against in previous 
years. The new Vice President is impressive on this score 
as well. Key players, such as Marsillam Simandjuntak, 
Denny Indrayana or Buyung Nasution, who recently has 
sharpened his tone markedly, have a sterling track record. 
And the President has stated his commitment. But for 
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many others, law and rights is a political commodity, 
it is tradable goods, stuff you can sell. There is no real 
recognition that it fundamentally matters.
Of course, the situation is not easy. It is fine and good 
for Buyung to call for legal reform as he just did, I would 
do so in his place, but it is not at all easy to give that 
meaning? And impact? As the Blueprints reveal, the 
scope is massive and intricate at the same time, and reform 
really is a long grinding slog through difficult issues, with 
a lot of resistance along the way. One thing we learned 
in 1998 is that the rule of law is not like an engine that 
can stand dormant for 30 to 40 years and then you can 
start it up by turning the key of democracy. The 30 to 40 
years of miserable condition of the judiciary turned the 
judiciary into something different from what it was. The 
fix is not at all easy. So if we say, “Let’s empower courts. 
Let’s respect courts,” what if the courts are actually fairly 
disrespectable Lawyers much like politicians are adept at 
using such grand phrases, but it is a long way from those 
high flown words to a wild and pretty unwieldy reality. 
Breaking down principles into manageable blocks and 
build those up actually is a pretty complicated process. 
It is very incremental by its very nature. 
This being said, the government does have a major 
responsibility on which I feel it defaults. The government 
must impress on the community that it views courts 
as critically important, the government must demand 
unquestioned respect to its officers, the government must 
say that it will uphold their dignity, as well as the decisions 
and orders the courts issue, that it will implement those, 
and that it considers itself bound by them. All those things 
are missing, as recent events illustrate. The Reformasi state 
continues to be in so many ways a state run by bureaucratic 
rules, not by rights and process.
For their part, the courts should step up also. Of course, 
and as I have said, there are so many issues left, right, 
and centre. But what is missing most is a kind of public 
commitment, an animating purpose that is clearly stated. 
That involves the judiciary to publicly assert itself when 
the interests of it as the constitutional guardian are at issue. 
Instead, and after being under the heel for so long, the 
judiciary is drenched in non-assertiveness, and its corollary 
of prickly over-defensiveness. It must learn to assert itself 
by projecting its authority and specifically by applying its 
powers at times and on issues that really matter, as the 
courageous first Chief Justice Kusumah Atmadja did in 
facing down the military, or Constitutional Court Chief 
Justice Mahfud did in playing that tape and then saying 
he would do so again when the government tried to block 
future recurrences. That is something no-one can give; 
the judiciary must generate that courage and vision itself.
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The Executive Network (TEN) hosted a panel on the new 
DPR (House of Representatives) on 11 November. The 
following is an edited transcript of the remarks of Kevin 
Evans, Senior Governance and Integrity Adviser to the 
head BRR (Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi).
Kevin Evans:  So what can we expect from this parliament? 
This is a question of comparing it to the previous parliament. 
The first dynamic we should consider is that we have an 
extraordinarily high turnover. In most countries, you do 
not see a 70 percent turnover in politicians, and this is 
higher than in the previous two elections. We have an 
outrageously high turnover. Some might say that it’s a good 
thing, but I also think there’s a downside. In parliament, 
you have people who are supposed to be holding the 
government to account. [With a high turnover,] what you 
have is a bunch of greenhorns who are sitting there trying 
to hold 30-year ‘Sir Humphrey 
Applebees’ to account, which 
is not an easy thing to achieve. 
Essentially, this new generation 
has to come in and learn the 
ropes. They must learn the types 
of questions they’re supposed to 
ask in order to get actual answers. 
This takes time. With such a huge 
turnover of politicians, we have a huge learning curve 
collectively. We’re fortunate today to have with us two 
politicians who are actually going into their second term. 
They will bring with them their experience from the last 
five years and familiarity with the process.
We heard their approaches and they are on the path 
towards operating in the way they will need to, in order 
to survive in this new environment. The first speaker 
outlined how you work your electorate:  the way you serve 
the interests of your constituents. That is the way of the 
future. Our second speaker indicated that it is necessary 
to maintain some autonomy from the leadership of your 
political party in order to maneuver more effectively to 
promote the agenda that you are working towards. In my 
view, these are the kinds of things that we are likely to 
hear more of from politicians who survive. 
One of the reasons for this is what happened after the 
Constitutional Court’s decision [to move to an open 
list system] after Christmas last year had a bigger impact 
on elections and the way that electoral politics works 
here than anything in the previous sixty years. What 
it essentially did for the first time ever was to say to 
budding politicians, “You actually need the voters as 
much as you much as you need your party support. It is 
no longer enough to be number one on your party list 
to get elected.” Numerous candidates who were number 
one were defeated by candidates who were number two. 
There were a couple of interesting outcomes of this 
decision. A lot of my feminist friends were horrified by 
the decision because they thought it would mean the 
end of female representatives. My argument was that the 
voters didn’t really care. They minded at the level of the 
president, but at the level of the representative, they don’t 
really discriminate. What we saw 
was, between those who were 
elected and those who would 
have been elected if the party list 
was still in place, there was one 
more woman than we would have 
got had we had the old system 
in place. What is ostensibly the 
case is that party structures are 
actually more reticent to have 
women elected than the broader electorate. That’s not 
to say that families are particularly happy when wives, 
mothers, daughter go off to parliament. 
Interestingly, in some of the regions where there is quite 
poor equality between men and women, you did in fact 
see men leapfrogging over women, and in other regions 
where clearly the situation is more advanced, you saw 
women jumping over men. In Aceh, Bali, Nusa Tenggara 
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another important element necessary to see exactly where 
politicians stand. 
The issue that I know everyone is talking about is the impact 
of the KPK [Corruption Eradication Commission] and 
the rather less than full-on support that is coming from 
the parliament. Some say that 
these developments mean that 
Indonesia is going backwards.  I 
would call this the ‘jihad akbar’ 
or the ‘battle royale’ depending 
on your theological background. 
This is the battle that in some 
respects has been waiting for ten 
years. For the last ten years, we’ve 
seen steady progress. The people, 
the groups, and the institutions 
that had a more comfortable 
way of operating under the 
old system have essentially not 
dared to confront this current ideology. What has now 
emerged, and I think because the KPK is really starting to 
hit home at some profoundly important vested interests, 
is that important people are now mobilizing to challenge 
it. So in some respects, what is going on at this stage 
actually represents a healthy development because what 
it is showing is that actually the agenda is vital, actually 
the KPK is being effective, and people are really started 
to get worried about how they are to go about business. 
What I would like to see 
happening next is to see people 
starting to ask the question, 
“Well, how do we fix the system?” 
The parliament could do one of 
two things. It could either head down the easy path, and 
continue to not fully support the KPK, and that would 
be the easy option and probably something they could 
get away with because there are three years left before 
they start campaigning for the next election. The other 
option, and the one that is better for the country, is to 
ask, “How can we go about our business? Obviously 
dishing out brown paper envelopes or brown suitcases is 
not the best way of doing things. We should be able to 
do things better. Yes, the parties need money, and that 
is a legitimate concern, but the question is how do we 
Barat, you saw women being defeated, but then across 
Java and parts of northern Sulawesi, you actually saw 
quite the reverse. 
A more important phenomenon to note was that local 
candidates were the major beneficiaries [of the change to 
open list system]. Many times 
the favoured son or daughter of 
the party placed at number one 
from Jakarta was defeated by 
some unknown local candidate 
who was at number 10, or who 
was well down the list, and who 
presumably won the seat because 
they had a network and a profile 
locally:  they actually managed 
to gain sufficient support to get 
themselves elected. This is the 
kind of incentive we are going 
to see moving forward. 
A lot of the donor community would say, “We need to 
teach politicians how to represent their constituents.” My 
view always was that that was nonsense; they were not 
paid to represent their constituents, there was no incentive 
for them to do so. They were not elected because they did 
nice things for their electorate. They got elected because 
they did nice things for the people who ran their parties 
because that was where their fate was determined. Now 
that’s changed. Now there’s a 
sincere and genuine need, for 
politicians who want to survive, 
that the electorate have some 
familiarity with them and think 
that they are actually doing 
a decent job. That may represent a significant shift in 
the way we can expect politicians to act or, at least, to 
represent themselves. 
I’m extremely heartened by some of the changes in the 
operations in the parliament that are being made, like 
the public accounts committee and other mechanisms. 
I welcome those developments from the parliament 
and hope those initiatives are properly resourced and 
able to undertake their task. For example, open sessions 
becoming the norm, rather than a gift to the public, is 
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go about raising the resources necessary to maintain our 
organization without having to do silly deals, which we 
know aren’t right and which we wish we didn’t have to 
do.” The process must move on from catching everybody 
to actually fixing the system. 
This means working more on the preventative side and 
one obvious way to do it is to reinstall the public financing 
system. After the 1999 elections, there was relatively generous 
public financing support, and the mistake came in 2005 
when the then-Home Minister 
changed the way that support 
was calculated for parties and 
essentially chopped off 95 percent 
of the funding. That was a terrible 
thing to do because it left the 
parties in considerable difficulty, 
and people and organizations 
had to survive some how. 
What has been extremely heartening is just how profound 
and strong the support for the institution [the KPK] and 
the agenda of anti-corruption has been in this country 
ten years on. I assume a lot of people thought it would 
peter out rather quickly. It would be a dangerous move 
by institutions to go against that level of public support, 
particularly elected institutions. 
There are a couple of things I 
still think require a bit more 
attention. One of which is to 
close what I call the ‘democratic 
deficit’ which essentially exists 
because we have a fully elected 
house of parliament [DPD] that 
has no authorities. That seems a 
bit strange. It would be as bad as 
the House of Lords in England 
having serious legislative powers. 
I mean, if the chamber’s elected, 
give it authorities. The deal that obviously has to be done 
here is to ensure that the parties are able to operate freely 
in the upper house (DPD). Senior politicians should want 
to be in that chamber, and that is going to require a shift in 
mindset. If I was a politician from West Java, why would 
I want to be one of 100 representatives in the DPR when 
I could be one of four in the DPD? It will require a series 
of discussions and will require adjusting the constitution 
with the electoral laws and perhaps even the party law, 
but I think that would open the path to having effective 
regional representation and effective representation by 
population. That’s some medium-term homework. 
Another one of the challenges that Indonesia continues 
to struggle with is this view that it’s always been a 
presidential system, and now it is officially what it always 
was because the constitution says 
so. Actually Indonesia’s traditions 
are profoundly parliamentary, 
including the 1945 Constitution 
which was actually an extreme 
form of a parliamentary system 
which doesn’t actually exist 
anywhere else. You see this 
challenge between what people 
would take to be a presidential 
system, but with parliamentary traditions being reflected 
in strange things. For example, the president or the 
government feels like they need to have control over a 
majority of the members of parliament, and think that 
they are critical for their survival. This is nonsense. You 
need that in a parliamentary system because you get votes 
of no-confidence. What happens 
in this [presidential] system is 
that the parliament becomes 
in itself a form of opposition 
to the government. One could 
ask President Obama this right 
now. He has a clear majority 
in both houses, but the poor 
man can barely pass a piece 
of toilet paper through. The 
source of opposition becomes 
the parliament itself rather than 
necessarily the parties. 
In Indonesia, you see that often times the biggest 
opposition isn’t those who claim to be in the opposition 
because they are the minority, but it’s from inside the 
government’s coalition. The President’s main concern 
is not PDI-P, Gerindra, or Hanura, but, particularly for 
the next election, the concern will be about the non-
It would be a dangerous 
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Democrat elements within his coalition. The question 
he should ask is whether he actually needs those parties 
in coalition, and to what extent is he compromising his 
ability to make policy through this kind of activity?  This 
reflects the parliamentary tradition that is not being 
effectively applied. 
The final point I will make is on the notion of consensus. 
The parliament seeks to operate in a way where everyone 
agrees. On one level, a strength of this society is the 
attempt to be inclusive. The downside is that it does 
become a mechanism for obfuscating accountability. If 
everyone evades accountability, the entire parliament will 
fall into disrepute. I think an appropriate interpretation 
of consensus should be one where everyone agrees to the 
rules of the game. Like for an election, not everyone can 
be president who runs for president, but you agree to the 
rules of the game, and you accept the outcome. Similarly 
in a parliament, you don’t have to agree with every law 
that goes through, but you have to agree to the process, 
and you accept the outcome of that process, regardless of 
whether you are on the winning or losing side of the debate. 
In terms of accountability of parties and politicians, there 
is great merit to be able to stand up and say, “I don’t agree.” 
I think the law on pornography was an interesting case. In 
the end, those opposing the bill had to leave the debate, 
which is a way of rejecting the process and which is an 
extreme case of what happens when the process to build 
consensus breaks down. With the beginning of committee 
work, and with open sessions, hopefully that will allow 
accountability to take place, and voters will have more 
information upon which to base their decision in the 
next election. 
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Politics
* JFCC: Lunch with Vice President Boediono 
 Jakarta, 25 November (to be confirmed)
* House of Representatives:  Golkar and PDI-P will submit their petition calling for a special committee 
 to investigate the Bank Century case
 Jakarta, 1 December
* ASEAN: Ministerial Meeting for Social Welfare and Development (SOMSWD)    
 Brunei Darussalam, 6 December
* United Nations Climate Change Conference
 Copenhagen, 6-7 December
Economy & Business
*  UN ESCAP:  Committee on Macroeconomic Policy, Poverty Reduction and Inclusive Development
 Bangkok, 24-26 November
* World Bank Seminar:  Indonesia Economic Outlook 2010: Facing the Global Economic Unrest 
 Speakers will include:  Sri Mulyani Indrawati, (Minister of Finance), Shubham Chaudury (World Bank 
 Senior Economist), Milan Zavadjil (IMF)
 Usmar Ismail Hall, Kuningan, Jakarta, 24 November
* OECD: 5th Annual Conference OECD-CEPII: Developing Countries and the Global Crisis Programme
 Paris, 26-27 November
* WTO:  7th Ministerial Conference:  “The WTO, the Multilateral Trading System, and the Current Global 
 Economic Environment”
 Geneva, 30 November- 2 December
* JFCC: Lunch with Trade Minister Mari Pangestu (to be confirmed)
 Jakarta, 16 December
* A new president director of Perum Bulog (Badan Urusan Logistik), the state-owned logistics agency, will be 
 named, likely in the next week, as the current president director, Mustafa Abubakar, was named Minister of 
 State-Owned Enterprises. 
* The president director of PT Perusahaah Listrik Negara (PLN), the state utility firm, will also be replaced, 
 likely in the next two weeks.
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